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FEDERAL PROTECTION, PATERNALISM, AND THE
VIRTUALLY FORGOTTEN PROHIBITION OF VOLUNTARY
PEONAGE
Aviam Soif*
The Peonage Abolition Act of 1867 abolished voluntary as well as
involuntay servitude. Congress did this in sweeping terms, based on the
Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment, but Congress explic-
itly extended protections beyond those proclaimed in Section 1 of that
Amendment. The historical context makes it clear that the men of the
Thirty-Ninth Congress believed Congress had broad power to protect free
labor on a national basis. The breadth of these new protections would, if
necessary, prevail over either states' rights or private contractual claims.
The statute's virtually unchanged current codification in 42 US.C.
§ 1994 is generally overlooked, yet it could provide civil remedies for a
broad field of coercive employment situations. Resuscitating the 1867
Act might avoid some of the dfficulties encountered in recent federal
prosecutions for human trafficking, for example, as well as in civil ef-
forts to protect vulnerable workers.
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INTRODUCTION
[U]nder the constitutional amendment Congress is bound to
see that freedom is in fact secured to every person throughout
the land; he must be fully protected in all his rights of person
and of property; and any legislation or any public sentiment
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which deprives any human being in the land of those great
rights of liberty will be in defiance of the Constitution, and if
the States and local authorities, by legislation or otherwise, deny
these rights, it is incumbent on us to see that they are secured.1
We have been blessed with a recent outpouring of excellent scholar-
ship about the Thirteenth Amendment.2 That Amendment's guarantee
of universal freedom is no longer nearly overlooked, nor is it still viewed
almost exclusively as a halfway house en route to the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 Impressive new work illuminates the importance of distin-
guishing between concepts of freedom of contract and freedom of la-
bor,4 for example, and scholars have convincingly emphasized the im-
portance of Congress's broad enforcement power to reach private ac-
tions through Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Important recent books, such as those by Risa Goluboff, Alexander
Tsesis, and Michael Vorenberg, have helped to underscore the rapid
changes in the evolution of the language of the Amendment and its use
and abuse in the decades that followed its enactment.' Despite the
strained and, at times, appalling recent judicial interpretations of the
vestiges of the 1866 Civil Rights Act that remain on the federal statute
* Dean and Professor, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai'i.
The Columbia Law Review staff did an outstanding job as they organized and hosted this
exemplary symposium and gracefully shepherded the Essays into print. The author wishes
to express great gratitude to them as well as to Maile Miller and Thomas Villal6n, who
have been exceptional research assistants. He also is grateful to Columbia University as the
institution from which both his parents received Master of Social Work degrees and where
his daughter currently is a student at Teachers College.
1. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1865) (statement of Sen. Lyman Trumbull).
2. Professor Alexander Tsesis has been at the center of several important symposia
concerning the Thirteenth Amendment and its implications, including this one. See
Symposium: Constitutional Redemption & Constitutional Faith, 71 Md. L. Rev. 953
(2012); Thirteenth Amendment Symposium, 38 U. Tol. L. Rev. 791 (2007). A symposium
jointly sponsored by the University of Chicago and Loyola University, Chicago in 2009
produced The Promises of Liberty: The History and Contemporary Relevance of the
Thirteenth Amendment (Alexander Tsesis ed., 2010) [hereinafter The Promises of
Liberty].
3. See, e.g., Michael Vorenberg, Citizenship and the Thirteenth Amendment:
Understanding the Deafening Silence, in The Promises of Liberty, supra note 2, at 58, 59
(discussing scholarship analyzing Fourteenth Amendment in light of Thirteenth
Amendment).
4. See, e.g., James Gray Pope, Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the
Constitutional Law of "Involuntary Servitude," 119 Yale L.J. 1474, 1479 (2010) (emphasiz-
ing Thirteenth Amendment protection developed in Pollock v. Williams, of workers'
"'power below"' to counter "'a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work"'
(quoting 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944))).
5. See generally Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights (2007) (examin-
ing legal history of economic claims as civil rights issues before Brown v. Board of
Education); Alexander Tsesis, The Thirteenth Amendment and American Freedom (2004)
(analyzing modern-day relevance of Thirteenth Amendment); Michael Vorenberg, Final
Freedom: The Civil War, the Abolition of Slavery, and the Thirteenth Amendment (2001)
(discussing history of creation of Thirteenth Amendment).
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books,6 legal scholars have never before recognized the importance of
that Act's bold guarantees as they now do.7 We are beginning to heed
what great historians have been pointing out for decades. More than
twenty years ago, for example, Eric Foner explained that the 1866 Civil
Rights Act
embodied a profound change in federal-state relations and re-
flected how ideas once considered Radical had been adopted by
the [Republican] party's mainstream.... Reflecting the convic-
tion, born of the Civil War, that the federal government pos-
sessed the authority to define and protect citizens' rights, the
bill represented a striking departure in American jurispru-
dence.8
Nonetheless, even the best and most careful recent legal scholarship
does not come to grips with the enormity and the fluidity of the crisis the
Thirty-Ninth Congress faced and the statutory changes it wrought in re-
sponse. Nor has adequate attention been paid to the broad scope of the
federal power that Congress believed it possessed and should use on the
basis of the Thirteenth Amendment. In particular, it has not been suffi-
ciently noticed how extensively the actions of the Thirty-Ninth Congress
during its final session in early 1867 changed federalism, thereby under-
scoring the extent of subsequent judicial interposition regarding state
action and states' rights claims. If anything, however, the egregiously re-
strictive doctrinal errors of late nineteenth-century judges have been
compounded in recent years.
The specific focus of this Essay is on the Peonage Abolition Act of
1867. It argues that the Thirty-Ninth Congress, in its effort to abolish all
6. See, e.g., Aviam Soifer, Protecting Full and Equal Rights: The Floor and More, in
The Promises of Liberty, supra note 2, at 196 [hereinafter Soifer, Full and Equal Rights]
(discussing historical and recent narrow treatment of federal statutory protections for core
civil rights adopted after the Civil War).
7. Some in legal academia, including the author of this Essay, have been poking at
the issue of the breadth and significance of the 1866 Civil Rights Act for decades, but
William Wiecek has been a leader in this quest throughout his distinguished career.
Therefore it is worthy of particular note that Wiecek recently declared, "The 1866 Civil
Rights Act, enacted under Congress's Thirteenth Amendment authority to end the inci-
dents of slavery and involuntary servitude, is the key to understanding the meaning of
freedom, equality, and civil status after abolition." William M. Wiecek, Emancipation and
Civic Status: The American Experience, 1865-1915, in The Promises of Liberty, supra note
2, at 78, 86.
8. Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, at 244-
45 (1988) [hereinafter Foner, Reconstruction]. See generally Aviam Soifer, Protecting
Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 651 (1979) [hereinaf-
ter Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights] (critically reviewing Raoul Berger, Government by
Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (1977) [hereinafter Berger,
Government by Judiciary]); Aviam Soifer, Status, Contract, and Promises Unkept, 96 Yale
L.J. 1916 (1987) [hereinafter Soifer, Promises Unkept] (discussing complexity of free
choice in context of slavery and its aftermath).
9. Peonage Abolition Act, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1994).
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the vestiges of slavery including any forms of peonage throughout the
United States and all federal territory, explicitly swept beyond the free-
doms guaranteed by Section 1 of the newly ratified Thirteenth
Amendment. Congress clearly believed that its enforcement power, as
provided to it by Section 2 of the Amendment, constituted the basis for
legislation not only to prohibit numerous forms of involuntary peonage
but also to forbid "voluntary peonage"-even though Section 1 of the
Thirteenth Amendment had declared simply that "[n]either slavery or
involuntary servitude ... shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to theirjurisdiction." 1°
The historical context makes it abundantly clear that this broad
antipeonage statute, enacted on the very day in March 1867 that
Congress voted to divide the South into five districts under military
rule, 1 undercuts the idea of abiding concern for state sovereignty and
states' rights in the Thirty-Ninth Congress. Congress sought to stamp out
not only vestiges of slavery but also all forms of peonage, no matter what
might be allowed by state laws or by state failures to act. This Essay con-
cludes by briefly discussing a few of the knotty issues surrounding the
very concept of voluntary peonage. In a sense, the Essay moves from what
at first might seem an anomalous statutory text to its context, and then,
briefly, to policy considerations. It never claims, however, that any of
these approaches affords a singular conceptual path for lawyers, judges,
and citizens to follow. Rather it is in accord with the view that " [ t] he past
has a vote, but it does not have a veto." 12 It also argues, however, that the
past ought not to be jettisoned or entirely forgotten.
In Part I, this Essay examines the text and the historical and political
context of the Peonage Abolition Act of 1867. It explores the theme of a
federal duty to afford protection, not only to all citizens, but also to every
person within the United States and its territories. In particular, it ques-
tions received wisdom about both the state action requirement and the
narrow interpretation of Congress's expansive powers under the
Enforcement Clauses of the post-Civil War Amendments. Finally, Part I
10. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1 (emphasis added). The words omitted contain the
exception "except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed." Id. It is striking that the final phrase of Section 1 still refers to the United States in
the plural, though the Civil War itself had already done much to forge a unitary national
entity and to make the United States singular.
11. Government of Rebel States, ch. 152, 14 Stat. 428 (1867).
12. Hasia R. Diner, The Jews of the United States, 1654 to 2000, at 254 (2004). Diner
quotes Rabbi Mordecai Kaplan, founder of the Reconstructionist movement within
Judaism, who claimed that "hatakha (Jewish law] should have a vote, but not a veto." This
epigram soon transformed into "the past should have a vote, but not a veto," representing
a central concept of his movement. See David Ellenson, Kaplan, Mordecai, in Concise
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy 433, 433 (2010) (giving overview of Kaplan's con-
tributions). See generally Mel Scult, Judaism Faces the Twentieth Century: A Biography of
Mordecai M. Kaplan (1993) (recounting Rabbi Kaplan's life and works).
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discusses the broad dimensions of the added protections enacted by the
Thirty-Ninth Congress.
Part II uses biblical stories as well as history and recentjudicial deci-
sions to suggest the importance, and the complexity, of the concept of
voluntary peonage. It wrestles with the question of if, and when, paternal-
ism may be acceptable, particularly to protect those most vulnerable and
most susceptible to making "free choices" that are not truly free. It also
briefly points out the unrealized promise of the ban on voluntary peon-
age that is still on the books, virtually unchanged since 1867.
I. THE PEONAGE ABOLITION ACT OF 1867: CHANGING CONTEXT AND TEXT
A. Some Background
President Andrew Johnson's March 27 veto of the 1866 Civil Rights
Act-and his remarkably provocative veto message-triggered the first
congressional override of any presidential veto of a major bill in the na-
tion's history.1 3 Johnson's veto of the Civil Rights Act closely followed his
veto of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill, which had shocked Moderate
Republicans such as Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, who believed
he had assurances that the President would sign the bill to assist and pro-
tect the newly freed slaves.14
Just two days after his earlier Freedmen's Bureau Bill veto in
February, Johnson added insult to injury during his rambling
Washington's Birthday address to a crowd of well-wishers. In his hour-
long harangue, Johnson referred to himself over 200 times, and he
identified congressional leaders Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner,
along with antislavery activist Wendell Philips, as men just as treasonous
as the leaders of the Confederacy. 3 Johnson's speech "stunned Northern
opinion," and his veto of the Civil Rights Act that soon followed "made
Radical leadership the only alternative to congressional surrender."' 6
The 1866 Civil Rights Act that was passed over Johnson's veto in
early April granted broad national citizenship and protected a vital list of
rights. 7 Particularly significant, albeit generally overlooked, was the Act's
13. W.R. Brock, An American Crisis: Congress and Reconstruction 1865-1867, at
113-14 (1963). Brock describes the dilemma moderate Republicans began to realize they
faced. They had a President they distrusted, who was apparently reviving the dogmatic
states' rights theory that many believed had caused the Civil War, on one side, and
Radicals urging the reconstruction of Southern society on the other. Id. at 116.
14. Id. at 104-06; Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 8, at 247.
15. Eric L. McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction 292-95 (1960); see also
Brock, supra note 13, at 110-11 (discussing speech); Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 8,
at 249 (same).
16. Brock, supra note 13, at 111, 121.
17. Section 1 of the Act reads,
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled, That all persons born in the United States and not subject to
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guarantee of "full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens."18 The
author of this Essay has argued elsewhere that this phrase sought to pro-
tect rights more substantially and more actively than simply to command
that everyone be treated equally.19 Indeed, the "full" aspect of "full and
equal" might well be read as a statutory precursor to the constitutional
guarantee of "protection" in the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the ongoing moral and legal struggle to determine what it might
mean to be "equal," Americans have virtually forgotten Section l's guar-
antee of "protection." Yet the national duty to protect the newly freed
slaves emerged overwhelmingly as the central theme for Moderate
Republicans, as well as for their Radical Republican colleagues, during
the debate leading up to the passage of the 1866 Civil Rights Act over
Johnson's veto.20 Furthermore, the breadth of rights guaranteed to all
citizens of the United States by the 1866 Civil Rights Act-an act that
Congress passed only a few months before the same men approved the
text of what became the Fourteenth Amendment-illuminates the core
assumptions that the Thirty-Ninth Congress made about the expansive
reach of the freedoms announced by the Thirteenth Amendment as well
as the broad congressional authority it granted.
21
any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citi-
zens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without re-
gard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is
enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and
penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
to the contrary notwithstanding.
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1982).
18. Id.
19. Soifer, Full and Equal Rights, supra note 6, at 211-12 ("The 'full' element of 'full
and equal' suggests that to treat everyone the same was neither the exclusive nor even the
main goal of the sweeping civil rights guarantee enacted by Congress."). Senator Nye of
Nevada may have described the guarantee most succinctly when he embraced Congress's
duty to afford "equalized protection under equalized laws." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1074 (1866) (statement of Sen.James Nye).
20. See, e.g., Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights, supra note 8, at 671-90.
21. Civil Rights Act § 1. The only exceptions to the broad coverage of Section 1 were
for those "subject to any foreign power" and for "Indians not taxed." Id. The sweeping
scope of the Act's citizenship declaration, as well as the vast range of the rights it enumer-
ated and sought to protect with civil, criminal, and removal power in the federal courts,
illustrates how expansive was the power that the men of the Thirty-Ninth Congress be-
lieved they had been afforded by the Thirteenth Amendment-which many of them had
voted for as members of the Thirty-Eighth Congress.
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As if to underscore these broad guarantees, a series of events in early
1866 exacerbated the irreparable rupture between President Johnson
and Congress. These events provide the crucial backdrop to the process
of drafting the Fourteenth Amendment, undertaken initially by the Joint
Committee of Fifteen, which was established as the Thirty-Ninth
Congress convened. 22 The temptation to pick apart the words of the
Fourteenth Amendment in a quest for a particular end often leads to
"law office history" at its worst, relying on selective quotation and ignor-
ing context entirely.23 Ironically, however, if one were to heed the con-
text in which the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted and sent to the
states, it would be virtually impossible to find effective support for the
"state action" doctrine during a period when the need for federal protec-
tion was clear and the status of the former states that composed the
Confederacy was entirely in flux. In early 1866, Congress was awash in
reports about formal discrimination rampant within the new Black Codes
adopted by the Southern states.24 In addition, however, the Joint
Committee of Fifteen gathered voluminous searing testimony about pri-
22. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction, consisting of six Senators and nine
Representatives, was chaired by Senator William Pitt Fessenden, a Moderate Republican
from Maine, and by Representative Thaddeus Stevens, leader of the Radical Republicans
from Pennsylvania. It was established to investigate conditions in the South and to report
on whether the Southern states were entitled to representation. Michael Les Benedict, A
Compromise of Principle: Congressional Republicans and Reconstruction 1863-1869, at
140-45 (1974).
23. "Law office history" is the tendency to pull words out of context for the sake of
advocacy. See Howard Jay Graham, The Fourteenth Amendment and School Segregation,
3 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1953) ("Facts are being determined and treated in isolation ... and
virtually out of their contexts. Law office history.., of this type could go on forever to no
clear result .... [E]ven if applied evenhandedly this method is open to serious objec-
tion."); Stephen A. Siegel, How Many Critiques Must Historians Write?, 45 Tulsa L. Rev.
823, 823 (2010) ("Historians coined the epithet 'law-office history' over a half-century ago
to describe the way Supreme CourtJustices distort the historical record to provide support
for positions they take on constitutional controversies."). Eric Foner illustrates this ten-
dency with the "influential examples" of Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5
(1949) (advocating limited interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment) and Raoul Berger,
Government By Judiciary, supra note 8 (same). Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 8, at
257 n.53; see also Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights, supra note 8 (challenging Berger's
scholarship). But cf. Raoul Berger, Soifer to the Rescue of History, 32 S.C. L. Rev. 427
(1981) (attempting to rebut the author's claims). See generally Robert J. Kaczorowski,
Searching for the Intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 Conn. L. Rev.
368 (1977) (surveying of attempts to interpret original intent of framers of Fourteenth
Amendment).
24. See, e.g., Jacobus tenBroek, Equal Under Law 180-81 (1965); see also Cong.
Globe, 39th Cong, 1st Sess. 340 (1866) (statement of Sen. James F. Wilson) ("[B]ut
wherever the Freedmen's Bureau does not reach, where its agents are not to be found,
there you will find injustice and cruelty, and whippings and scourgings and murders that
darken the continent. No man can deny this."); Leon F. Litwack, Been in the Storm So
Long: The Aftermath of Slavery 366-71 (1979) ("To many in the North, the [Black] Codes
smacked of the old bondage:").
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vate depredations that freedpersons and their supporters encountered
throughout the South.
25
It is not surprising that there were over seventy proposed drafts for a
Fourteenth Amendment by early 1866.26 For example, Senator William
M. Stewart of Nevada introduced a compromise proposal on behalf of
the Moderate Republicans that would have exchanged universal amnesty
for Southerners for an amendment that read, "All discriminations among
the people because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, ei-
ther in civil rights or the right of suffrage, are prohibited .... ,,2' And, as
Eric Foner pointed out in his summary of the tangled legislative history
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the draft amendment proposed by Ohio
Congressman John A. Bingham "granting Congress the authority to se-
cure the 'privileges and immunities' and 'equal protection of life, liberty,
and property' of all citizens" was tabled because "[m] ost Republicans be-
lieved Congress already possessed this power.
28
The duty to protect all those who had been made national citizens
by Section 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act became the core concern of the
Thirty-Ninth Congress. President Johnson's multiple blunders had only
begun with his drunken performance at his inauguration as Vice
President in March 1865. Johnson's enthusiasm for returning to the fed-
eralism of the pre-Civil War era and for readmission of the Southern
states as quickly as possible made it seem necessary for Congress to take
the lead.29 Johnson's blatant racism further fed Congress's desire for a
new federal order.3 0
25. Report of the Alleged Outrages in the Southern States by the Select Committee
of the Senate, S. Rep. No. 42-1 (1871); see also Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 8 at
224-27 (highlighting "white South's inability to adjust to the end of slavery, the wide-
spread mistreatment of blacks, Unionists, and Northerners, and a pervasive spirit of disloy-
alty"). But see J. Michael Quill, Prelude to the Radicals: The North and Reconstruction
During 1865, at 127-28 (1980) (quoting extensive reports of outrages but suggesting re-
ports had tendency to exaggerate).
26. Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 8, at 251-52.
27. S.J. Res. 62, Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1906 (1866). For a brief discussion
of Alexander Bickel's reading of this proposal, see Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights, supra
note 8, at 685 n.169. For an explanation of how Johnson's veto of the Civil Rights Act
doomed Stewart's proposal, see Brock, supra note 13, at 117-18.
28. Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 8, at 253; see Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Rights
of Citizenship: Two Framers, Two Amendments, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1269, 1281-82
(2009) (noting "the Thirty-Eighth Congress . . . thought their enforcement power was
broad indeed, and that it extended to proclaiming freed slaves as citizens and extending
to them the rights of citizenship"); see also tenBroek, supra note 24, at 205-08 ("Both
ideas of a constitutional guarantee and a grant of power to Congress prevailed in the
end.").
29. See Litwack, supra note 24, at 529 ("In upholding the principles of white suprem-
acy, in expediting the pardon of ex-Confederate leaders, in seeking to restore political and
economic power to the old ruling class, PresidentJohnson would act all too decisively.").
30. See, e.g., id. at 530 (reporting after meeting with Frederick Douglass, Johnson re-
portedly told his secretary "I know that damned Douglass; he'sjust like any nigger, and he
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B. The 1866 Election and the Peonage Abolition Act of 1867
The summer and fall that followed the battles over President
Johnson's vetoes of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill and the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 produced a stunning political disaster for Johnson. It should not
be forgotten, however, that over the same period blacks in the South suf-
fered much more serious harm. Terrible race riots in Memphis and New
Orleans took scores of black lives; these were only the most dramatic
among the multiple assaults and blatant deprivations of rights that
freedpersons and their allies repeatedly encountered throughout the
South.31 Meanwhile, in the summer of 1866 President Johnson sought to
form a new National Union Party, combining Conservative Republicans
with sympathetic Democrats. The Philadelphia Convention called to
launch this new alliance was a complete bust, however, and internal divi-
sions quickly doomed Johnson's efforts.32 Nonetheless, Johnson decided
to take his own Reconstruction ideas directly to the people.
Johnson's unprecedented "Swing Round the Circle" campaign
proved such a debacle that even the President's stalwart supporters were
appalled.33 His ham-handed attempts to utilize patronage similarly back-
fired. The Republicans won in a national landslide in November, in part
because of the political appeal of the Fourteenth Amendment they had
would sooner cut a white man's throat than not"); see also President Andrew Johnson,
Annual Message of the President to Congress (Dec. 3, 1867), in Foreign Relations of the
United States (1868), at 1, 6 (recording Johnson's remark, in his annual message to
Congress, that blacks have "shown less capacity for government than any other race of
people" and that "wherever they have been left to their own devices they have shown a
constant tendency to relapse into barbarism"); W.E.B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in
America 322 (1935) ("The transubstantiation of Andrew Johnson was complete ....
Because he could not conceive of Negroes as men, he refused to advocate universal
democracy, of which, in his young manhood, he had been a fierce advocate, and made
strong alliance with those who would restore slavery under another name."). See generally
Annette Gordon-Reed, AndrewJohnson 2 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. & Sean Wilentz eds.,
2011) (recounting Frederick Douglass's dismayed reaction on meeting Johnson).
31. For accounts of the Memphis and New Orleans race riots of 1866, see, respec-
tively, Memphis Riot, Encyclopedia of the Reconstruction Era (Richard Zuczek ed., 2006),
and John Kendall, History of New Orleans 303-14 (1992); see also Litwack, supra note 24,
at 281. For a catalog of attacks reported in Southern states against freedmen, see generally
Report of the Alleged Outrages in the Southern States by the Select Committee of the
Senate, S. Rep. No. 42-1 (1871).
32. See, e.g., Hans L. Trefousse, Andrew Johnson: A Biography 255-71 (1989)
(describing Johnson's failed efforts to build bipartisan coalition during 1866 National
Union Convention).
33. See Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 8, at 264-65 (noting contention by
Senator James R. Doolittle (Republican from Wisconsin), who chaired National Union
Convention in Philadelphia in its failed attempt to launch new national political party in
1866, thatJohnson's disastrously unpopular speaking tour may have costJohnson and his
allies a million Northern votes).
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just promulgated over Johnson's objections.34 Not surprisingly, in the
wake of the terrible Civil War, voters in the victorious North simply could
not abide Johnson's plan for unconditional and immediate readmission
of the Southern states.
The lame-duck Thirty-Ninth Congress that got down to business in
January 1867 thus was well aware that the Congress that would soon suc-
ceed them would have a solid majority, easily able to muster the two-
thirds votes needed to override Johnson's vetoes." As the Thirty-Ninth
Congress reconvened, it was prepared to do battle over black suffrage as
well to fight the President over the questions of whether, when, and how
to reinstate the Southern states.
Though the Fourteenth Amendment was not yet in place, these vet-
eran members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress were convinced that Section
2 of the Thirteenth Amendment afforded them ample constitutional au-
thority to forbid peonage of any kind. The debate on this issue kicked off
on January 3, 1867, the first day of the session, with a troubling report
introduced by Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts about U.S. Army
personnel directly aiding a system of peonage that exploited Mexicans, as
well as Indians, captured for the purpose of making them peons in the
New Mexico Territory. 36 On the House side, Representative Thaddeus
Stevens delivered a blistering speech in which he cried out for protection
of "our loyal brethren at the South, whether they be black or white,
whether they go there from the North or are natives of the rebel States,"
who desperately needed Congress to proceed at once to protect them
"from the barbarians who are now daily murdering them."37
Congress easily adopted the Peonage Abolition Act of 1867" on
March 2, after debates in both the Senate and the House made it clear
34. See id. at 267 ("[T]he election became a referendum on the Fourteenth
Amendment.... And the result was a disastrous defeat for the President.... [V] oters con-
firmed the massive Congressional majority Republicans had achieved in 1864.").
35. See id. (discussing congressional Republicans' controlling position).
36. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 239-40 (1867). Other items on the Senate
agenda that day included land grants for railroads, id. at 239, the Tenure of Office Act, id.
at 241, attempts to control false representations to immigrants that induced them into
servitude, id. at 247, and a proposed resolution seeking to instruct the Judiciary
Committee to seek measures, if any, that could be taken "to prevent the Supreme Court
from releasing and discharging the assassins of Mr. Lincoln and the conspirators to release
the rebel prisoners at Camp Douglas, in Chicago." Id. at 249. This resolution failed to ob-
tain unanimous consent. Id.
37. Id. at 251. Stevens also asserted that in the United States, "the whole sovereignty
rests with the people, and is exercised through their Representatives in Congress assem-
bled." Thus, Stevens declared, "No Government official, from President and ChiefJustice
down, can do any one act which is not prescribed and directed by legislative power." Id. at
252. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866), drew
particular ire because Stevens read it to endanger all efforts to use the military to protect
freed blacks and loyal unionists. Id. at 251.
38. Peonage Abolition Act, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546, 546 (1867) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1994). The Act provided, in relevant part,
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that the Act's coverage stretched well beyond protecting former black
slaves. It is noteworthy that the language of the Act swept very broadly as
it banned "the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as pe-
ons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise."39 The Act thus
did not restrict the definition of the peonage; it forbade compelled labor
due to "debt." Yet the 1867 Act also recognized that the treatment it
sought to prohibit, whether involuntary or voluntary, could be compelled
in many different ways. This included "usages"40 as well as the laws and
ordinances now generally considered necessary to supply the "color of
law," or state action, that is currently requisite to obtain coverage under
most federal civil rights statutes. As in the statutory reference to "custom,
or usage" in the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871," 1 the Thirty-Ninth Congress
understood all too well that anonymous nightriders, for example, were
often entirely successful in depriving former slaves and their allies of
The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peon-
age is... abolished and forever prohibited in the territory of New Mexico, or in
any Territory or State of the United States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders,
regulations, or usages of the Territory of New Mexico, or of any other Territory
or State of the United States, which have heretofore established, maintained, or
enforced, or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish,
maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service
or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or oth-
erwise... are hereby, declared null and void.
Id.
James Gray Pope, Lea S. VanderVelde, and Rebecca E. Zietlow have produced first-
rate accounts of the background and implications of antipeonage legislation. See, e.g.,
Pope, supra note 4, at 1482-87 (reviewing legislative origins of "right to quit work" as set
forth in Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and Peonage Abolition Act of 1867); Lea
VanderVelde, The Thirteenth Amendment of Our Aspirations, 38 U. Tol. L. Rev. 855,
857-59 (2007) (discussing five historical uses of Congress's Section 2 enforcement power
under Thirteenth Amendment); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-Subordination and
the Thirteenth Amendment, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 255, 262, 290-92 (2010) (discussing passage
of anti-peonage acts during Reconstruction era). See generally Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free
Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War 11-18 (1970)
[hereinafter Foner, Free Soil] (discussing Republican ideal of free labor in mid-
nineteenth century); Robert J. Steinfeld, The Invention of Free Labor: The Employment
Relation in English and American Law and Culture, 1350-1870, at 15-24 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter Steinfeld, Invention of Free Labor] (discussing longstanding acceptance of indentured
servitude before nineteenth century). Eric Foner's book, published more than forty years
ago, remains vital to understanding these slippery and yet fundamental matters.
39. Peonage Abolition Act, 14 Stat. at 546 (emphasis added).
40. Id.
41. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (1871) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 241 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), 1988).
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basic rights-and many times of their lives 42 -without overt involvement
by the state or by any state officials whatsoever.4"
With the Peonage Abolition Act, Congress extended its statutory
protections considerably. It directly reached beyond the prohibitions that
the text of Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment announced explic-
itly. The Amendment's ban of "slavery" and "involuntary servitude" af-
forded the constitutional basis for the Thirty-Ninth Congress to add pro-
tection against any attempt "to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or
indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as
peons."" Clearly, the Thirty-Ninth Congress believed it had adequate
authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to add "voluntary" peonage
to the involuntary peonage that the Amendment's text specifically
banned. The Peonage Act's protections even stretched beyond the tradi-
tional definition of peonage anchored in debt or obligation; the new stat-
ute would also reach obligations "otherwise" imposed.45 Though effective
42. See, e.g., Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 8, at 425-44 (discussing
"counterrevolutionary terror" created by Ku Klux Klan violence in American South in
1860s and 1870s); Allen W. Trelease, White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and
Southern Reconstruction, at xvii-xxv, xlii-xlviii (1971).
43. Justice John Harlan's strained reading of the statutory language of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 to interpret "custom and usage" to require acts by government officials in Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 162-69 (1970), demonstrates the kinds of somersaults
required to maintain the state action barrier. Rather incredibly, the Court rejected the
civil rights claim of a white schoolteacher refused service at a lunch counter in
Hattiesburg, Mississippi when she accompanied six black students there because she had
not proved the requisite involvement of state officials with store personnel before she was
arrested for vagrancy upon leaving the store. Id. at 146-47, 169-70.
On the other hand, if Shelley v. Kraemer is to be taken seriously, there seems no stop-
ping place once the origin story identifies the arm of the state behind the enforcement of
the laws. 334 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1948) (finding state court's enforcement of restrictive cove-
nant constitutes state action). Like turtles in what may be an apocryphal ancient myth, it
becomes state action all the way down. Clifford Geertz, Thick Description: Toward an
Interpretive Theory of Culture, in The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays 28-29
(1973) (describing turtle myth).
44. Peonage Abolition Act, 14 Stat. at 546
45. Peonage customarily entailed an obligation to labor for someone to pay off a
debt. Indentured servitude arrangements that brought many early settlers to the American
colonies, for example, generally obligated the immigrant to work for a specified number
of years to pay for his transportation and upkeep. Similar obligations, including harsh
working conditions, were later imposed on Asian immigrants and former slaves. See, e.g.,
Steinfeld, Invention of Free Labor, supra note 38, at 51, 137, 177 (explaining obligation
structure of indentured servitude contracts, use of indentured servitude by slave owners to
"keep their former slaves in bondage," and use of indentured servitude contracts for
Chinese immigrants in mid-nineteenth century); see also Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of
Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United States Supreme Court, 1888-
1921, 5 Law & Hist. Rev. 249, 270-74 (1987) [hereinafter, Soifer, Paradox of Paternalism]
(explaining that in early twentieth-century Supreme Court case law, "[fireedom of con-
tract remained sufficiently vital to preclude intervention in labor-management affairs,
particularly when the state's policy suggested redistribution of wealth or power"); Wilma
Sur, Hawai'i's Masters and Servants Act: Brutal Slavery?, 31 U. Haw. L. Rev. 87, 108-12
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enforcement of these prohibitions clearly was and would remain an over-
whelming problem, it bears noting that the Thirty-Ninth Congress finally
passed the Military Reconstruction Act over President Johnson's veto on
March 2, 1867-the same day it adopted the Peonage Act.
The Military Reconstruction Act, which divided the eleven Southern
states (except Tennessee) into five military districts to be occupied by the
United States Army, is hardly rooted in an ethos of states' rights or state
sovereignty. 46 For many good reasons, Congress remained deeply con-
cerned about the adequacy of the protection that was being provided by
state and local officials to blacks and their allies in the South. Indeed,
Congress's order of military occupation suggests an overarching legisla-
tive concern regarding the tragic consequences that freedmen and
Unionists faced as a result of egregious, widespread failure to afford
them even basic protection.
Defying the President, the Act also laid out steps for the organiza-
tion and admission of new states that included affording manhood suf-
frage to all, writing new state constitutions, and ratifying the Fourteenth
Amendment.47 Andrew Johnson's most recent biographer, Annette
Gordon-Reed, described the President as "beside himself' as he declared
the Act to be a product of "anarchy and chaos" and saw it as an attempt
to hurt Southerners in order "to protect niggers."48 The Thirty-Ninth
Congress also added a new Habeas Corpus Act that, like the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, extensively increased the possibilities for removal of state
cases to federal court.4 9 Finally, the Thirty-Ninth Congress ended by call-
ing the Fortieth Congress into session two days later.
50
C. Cases and Implications
W.R. Brock argued in his exemplary study of the early
Reconstruction period that Congress sought legislative supremacy some-
(2008) (discussing violent conditions imposed on Hawai'i'sJapanese and Chinese contract
laborers). The contractual obligation approach is still in use today. See Trafficking Victims
Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101, 7102(4) (2006) (finding "the degrading institute of
slavery" exists in twenty-first century in form of indentured servitude and describing debt
bondage structure of modern human trafficking).
46. An Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States
(Military Reconstruction Act), ch. 153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429 (1867).
47. Id.
48. Gordon-Reed, supra note 30, at 129-30 (quoting Trefousse, supra note 32, at
279). Johnson also had declared, "This is a country for white men, and by God, as long as I
am President, it shall be a government for white men." Id. at 112 (citing Trefousse, supra
note 32, at 236).
49. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
50. Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 8, at 276-77. Foner noted, "The astonishingly
rapid evolution of Congressional attitudes that culminated in black suffrage arose both
from the crisis created by the obstinacy ofJohnson and the white South, and the determi-
nation of Radicals, blacks, and eventually Southern Unionists not to accept a
Reconstruction program that stopped short of this demand." Id. at 277.
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what akin to the British parliamentary system.5 There is certainly consid-
erable evidence that the men of the Thirty-Ninth Congress trusted nei-
ther the executive nor the Supreme Court. They were also committed to
changing the nature of federalism.
In the years that followed the final adjournment of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress, the Supreme Court provided an ample basis for that distrust.
In Blyew v. United States, for example, in the context of the horrific mur-
der of members of a black family, the Court held that the Federal Civil
Rights Act of 1866 did not trump a Kentucky statute that forbade blacks
from testifying against whites.52 Dissenting, Justices Bradley and Swayne
explained that section 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act reached state inac-
tion and that it "provides a remedy where the State refuses to give one;
where the mischief consists in inaction or refusal to act, or refusal to give
requisite relief."5 ' The evisceration of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Slaughter-House Cases, which was
51. See generally Brock, supra note 13.
[T]he Republicans could hardly fail to be conscious of the weight of opinion be-
hind them, and it was not unexpected that they should have spoken of them-
selves as national representatives of the national will, and regarded a President
who had been repudiated and a Supreme Court which represented no one and
still contained members who had concurred in the notorious Dred Scott deci-
sion as their inferiors in the scales of popular government. Legislative supremacy
looked more logical, more desirable and more just than executive encroach-
ments or judicial usurpations. If this view was challenged, as Johnson challenged
it, by stating that a Congress which excluded eleven States was no Congress, it
could be claimed that a Congress which had had authority to fight the war must
have equal authority to decide the conditions of peace.
Id. at 7.
52. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 593 (1872) ("[T]he Circuit Court had not jurisdiction of
the crime of murder ... because two persons who witnessed the murder were citizens of
the African race, and for that reason incompetent by the law of Kentucky to testify in the
courts of that State."); see also Ky. Rev. Stat., ch. 107, § 1 (1860); Robert D. Goldstein,
Blyew. Variations on aJurisdictional Theme, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 469, 500-08 (1989) (detailing
Court's holding); Soifer, Full and Equal Rights, supra note 6, at 206-08 (discussing facts,
holding, and impact of Blyew decision).
53. Blyew, 80 U.S. at 597 (Bradley, J., dissenting). In fact, Justice Bradley's dissent of-
fered a prtcis of the predominant argument throughout the final year of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress that clearly embraced national protection of civil rights:
Merely striking off the fetters of the slave, without removing the incidents and
consequences of slavery, would hardly have been a boon to the colored race.
Hence, also, the amendment abolishing slavery was supplemented by a clause
giving Congress power to enforce it by appropriate legislation. No law was neces-
sary to abolish slavery; the amendment did that. The power to enforce the
amendment by appropriate legislation must be a power to do away with the inci-
dents and consequences of slavery, and to instate the freedmen in the full enjoy-
ment of that civil liberty and equality which the abolition of slavery meant.
Id. at 601.
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anchored in states' rights rhetoric and in pre-Civil War notions of
federalism, soon followed. 4
By 1875, the unanimous Supreme Court could proclaim that it was
obliged to "roll back the tide of time, and to imagine ourselves" back in
Mississippi before abolition.55 Once having performed this extraordinary
feat of time travel, the Court found it remarkably easy to deny a former
slave any share from the proceeds of cotton sold after the United States
Army impounded it in 1863 on the plantation where he literally had
slaved away for many years. Everyone knew, after all, that a slave in
Mississippi could not make a contract.56 The fervor to return to what pur-
ported to be some form of normalcy-and the urge to reconstitute both
states' rights and racial discrimination-was powerful enough to bury the
vital statutory protections of 1866-1867. The radical revision of federal-
ism triggered by the Civil War and its aftermath that had boldly pro-
claimed a New Birth of Freedom quickly became an abandoned child. 7
D. Dimensions of Added Protections
The motivations among the members of Congress and their support-
ers were not entirely benign, to be sure. Some wanted to make sure that
the recently freed blacks did not migrate North, for instance, and others
were interested primarily in black suffrage and what it might do to help
the Republican Party. Some betrayed many of the appalling qualities of
paternalistic racism. In addition, in 1866 Congress was engaged in a com-
plex, practical tug-of-war about when and how the Southern states that
54. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 37 (1873) ("But with the exception of these and a few other
restrictions, the entire domain of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States, as
above defined, lay within the constitutional and legislative power of the States, and without
that of the Federal government.").
55. Hall v. United States, 92 U.S. 27, 30 (1875). Hall asserted that he had been born a
free man, but the Court determined that it did not have to reach this issue because Hall
had been sold and held in Mississippi as a slave, his color presumptively made him a slave,
and he had not availed himself of a Mississippi statute that was the exclusive means to
claim one's freedom. Id.
56. For the unanimous Court, Justice Swayne further explained,
It was an inflexible rule of the law of African slavery, wherever it existed, that the
slave was incapable of entering into any contract, not excepting the contract of
marriage.... [Thus] it is clear that if Hall did contract with Roach, as he alleges
he did, the contract was an utter nullity. In the view of the law, it created no ob-
ligation, and conferred no rights as to either of the parties. It was as if it were
not. This case must be determined as if slavery had not been abolished in
Mississippi, and the laws referred to were still in force there. The destruction of
the institution can have no effect upon the prior rights here in question.
Id. at 30-31.
57. Soifer, Promises Unkept, supra note 8, at 1950 ("A kind of deep structure of be-
lief in states' rights and sovereignty was an essential factor in the failure of
Reconstruction").
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had seceded could reenter the Union." As Leon Litwack's great book,
Been in the Storm So Long, makes abundantly clear, however, it also was ter-
ribly apparent that life in the South was chaotic and dangerous at best
and that the Freedmen's Bureau and military personnel who were pre-
sent were woefully inadequate to afford actual protection.
59
The government's duty to afford protection was a major trope in the
discussion of slavery and of the meaning of rights leading up to the Civil
War, perhaps most famously when it was listed first among all rights in
Justice Bushrod Washington's much-cited opinion in Corfield v. Coryell.6°
Though the phrase "equal protection" had taken on some particular
connotations prior to the Civil War,6 lawyers, judges, and the general
public all have almost entirely lost the "protection" part of that phrase
through our focus on its implications for equality considerations.
Furthermore, the awkward phrasing of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment-as it was declared to be ratified by Secretary of State
William Seward in 1868-has allowed judges and scholars to assume that
the obligation imposed on every state not to "deny to any within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws" forbids only active denial of
such protection. 6
2
58. See, e.g., id. at 1947 ("Moderates also allied with many Radicals in their desire to
keep the freedmen in the South, and to respond to the threat of increased congressional
power for the South now that blacks counted as full persons for purposes of calculating
representation."); see also Brock, supra note 13, at 95-105 (describing initiatives and con-
flicts during First Congressional Reconstruction).
59. See generally Litwack, supra note 24 (noting African Americans' struggle for
independence from end of Civil War through Reconstruction period).
60. 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (Washington, CircuitJustice, C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
61. Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw's opinion in Roberts v. City of Boston, in which the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected a challenge to the segregation of Boston's
public schools, interpreted equal protection not to include the notion that "men and
women are legally clothed with the same civil and political powers, and that children and
adults are legally to have the same functions and be subject to the same treatment." 59
Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 206 (1850). Rather, Shaw proclaimed, the equal protection that was
mentioned in the Massachusetts Constitution meant "only that the rights of all, as they are
settled and regulated by law, are equally entitled to the paternal consideration and protec-
tion of the law for their maintenance and security." Id.
This embrace and at least partial conflation of "paternal consideration" and "protec-
tion of the law" helps to explain why Justice Brown was delighted to invoke Shaw's decision
and to quote his language in rejecting Homer Plessy's attack on segregation in Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896). To the Plessy Court, it was "too clear for argument"
that the Thirteenth Amendment abolished nothing beyond slavery, bondage, and-some-
what remarkably-"the control of the labor and services of one man for the benefit of
another, and the absence of a legal right to the disposal of his own person, property, and
services." Id. at 542.
62. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. There may be a little willful amnesia regarding the
building blocks ofjudicial review under the Constitution taught in Constitutional Law I. In
Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall noted for the unanimous Court that
"[t] he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim
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If the historical context of the Fourteenth Amendment still warrants
consideration, as many people still believe it should, it ought to be of
considerable concern that Chief Justice Rehnquist carried his binary
action/inaction approach to absurd lengths in DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services.63 Writing for the majority, Rehnquist
announced that the purpose of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was "to protect the people from the State, not to
ensure that the State protected them from each other. The Framers were
content to leave the extent of governmental obligation in the latter area
to the democratic political processes." 64 Using a rigidly dichotomous ap-
proach, the Court held that Wisconsin had no constitutional duty to pro-
tect a four-year-old child who was being regularly visited by social workers
employed by the state after the state courts had awarded custody to the
child's abusive father. Because "[p]oorJoshua" 6 was not formally in state
custody, Rehnquist explained, the state owed him no protection.6 6
This is not to say that it would be easy to sort out when, how, and to
whom government actors owe protection. Such protection surely has jag-
ged edges much of the time, not least because it easily blurs into
the protection of laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of govern-
ment is to afford that protection." 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
63. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). For this and numerous additional reasons, the author cri-
tiqued the DeShaney decision to the point of calling it "an abomination." Aviam Soifer,
Moral Ambition, Formalism, and the "Free World" of DeShaney, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
1513, 1514 (1989). Though in retrospect this phrasing seems extreme, it also still seems
accurate.
64. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196. In denying that Wisconsin had any affirmative duty to
protect a child who was two years old when state officials first became involved with his
case and four when his father beat him so severely that he suffered "brain damage so se-
vere that he is expected to spend the rest of his life confined to an institution for the pro-
foundly retarded," id. at 193, Chief Justice Rehnquist hewed closely to Judge Posner's
analysis for the Seventh Circuit below. Posner had said "The state does not have a duty
enforceable by the federal courts to maintain a police force or a fire department, or to
protect children from their parents." 812 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1987), affd, 489 U.S. 189.
Dissenting, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, offered a devastat-
ing critique of the majority's "fixation on the general principle that the Constitution does
not establish positive rights." 489 U.S. at 205 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. 489 U.S. at 213 (Blackmun,J., dissenting.) Blackmun added,
Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bullying, cowardly, and intemper-
ate father, and abandoned by respondents, who placed him in a dangerous pre-
dicament and who knew or learned what was going on, and yet did essentially
nothing except, as the Court revealingly observes, "dutifully recorded these inci-
dents in [their] files." It is a sad commentary upon American life, and constitu-
tional principles-so full of late of patriotic fervor and proud proclamations
about "liberty and justice for all"-that this child, Joshua DeShaney, now is as-
signed to live out the remainder of his life profoundly retarded.
Id. (citation omitted). Blackmun's cri de coeur also tellingly invokes Robert Cover, Justice
Accused (1975), a brilliant study of the cognitive dissonance among judges who were per-
sonally opposed to slavery yet protested too much that their hands were tied and that they
thus were obliged to return fugitives to slavery.
66. 489 U.S. at 201 (majority opinion).
16232012]
COLUMBIA LAWREVIEW
paternalism. By 1866, for example, the self-evident problems surround-
ing the ways in which the federal government had been mistreating its
Indian "wards" underscored the pitfalls and complexity of such guardian-
ward relationships. Yet members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress were all
too aware of the desperate need to protect the freedpersons and their
allies. Eric Foner summed up the situation: "Again and again during the
debate on Trumbull's bills, Congressmen spoke of the national govern-
ment's responsibility to protect 'fundamental rights' of American citi-
zens."6 Foner added, however, that "as to the precise content of these
rights, uncertainty prevailed."68 Nonetheless, even Moderates preferred
to give both Congress and the federal courts "maximum flexibility in im-
plementing the [Fourteenth] Amendment's provisions and combating
the multitude of injustices that confronted blacks in many parts of the
South."69
E. State Action?
It seems a major mistake, considering both the broad and the spe-
cific historical context, to attempt to draw a fundamental or bright line
between private actions reached by the Thirteenth Amendment and pri-
vate actions that remain insulated from judicial review by the after-the-
fact "state action" requirement, purportedly imposed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The substantial restraint on both federal legislative and ju-
dicial powers that the state action requirement imposes actually was a
judicial construct, infamously applied by the Supreme Court in the Civil
Rights Cases to invalidate the public accommodations provisions of the
1875 Civil Rights Act that had been passed in large measure to memorial-
ize Senator Sumner.7 0
Justice Bradley's opinion for the majority in the Civil Rights Cases in-
structed black citizens that, less than eighteen years after slavery ended, it
was past time that a black man "takes the rank of a mere citizen, and
ceases to be the special favorite of the laws."71 In addition, the Court held
that it would be "running the slavery argument into the ground" to find
that Thirteenth Amendment protections against the badges and inci-
dents of slavery extended to prohibit racial discrimination in places of
public accommodation. 7
2
In fact, however, there is very little, if any, support for the "state ac-
tion" limitation within the debates and the legislation promulgated by
67. Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 8, at 244.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 258.
70. 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
71. Id. at 24-25. Notably, the majority assumed that blacks had in fact been special
favorites of the law-presumably referring to congressional legislation anchored in both
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
72, Id. at 24.
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the Thirty-Ninth Congress-the Congress that also drafted and approved
the Fourteenth Amendment. In his dissent in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
Justice Harlan struggled to make the case for a state action requirement
within the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 73 but the majority had the much
stronger argument. Indeed, if one reads the very quotations that Justice
Harlan relied upon in his dissent in the context of the recognized
governmental duty to protect the rights of all citizens in the wake of the
Civil War, it is clear that the men of the Thirty-Ninth Congress hoped in
the first instance that the states would do their duty, but that they also
sought to make sure that the federal government would serve as a back-
stop and guarantor if the states did not.74 The 1866 Civil Rights Act
greatly expanded the coverage of federal criminal law as well as the re-
moval jurisdiction of federal courts if and when states failed to protect
the broad panoply of civil rights identified in its first section. Until 1968
and Jones, however, the portions of the 1866 Act that remained on the
statute books had long been buried under an avalanche of decisions
making "state action" and "color of state law" inescapable prerequisites in
civil rights litigation.75
Charles L. Black, Jr., the great constitutional law scholar, teacher,
and lawyer, published a remarkable article in 1967 that made a compel-
ling case for abandoning the "state action" requirement entirely for
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.7 6 He pointed out that
by 1967-long before the chaotic development of state action doctrine in
a series of opinions written largely by Chief Justice Rehnquist-lawyers
73. 392 U.S. 409, 449-50 (1968) (Harlan,J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's construction
of § 1982 as applying to purely private conduct is almost surely wrong, and at the least is
open to serious doubt.").
74. Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights, supra note 8, at 676 ("All citizens were to have the
same rights-and the complete and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for security
of person and property-as enjoyed by paradigmatic white citizens. Any law or statute to
the contrary was superseded." (citations omitted)).
75. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 (holding Act only "provide[s]
modes of relief against State Legislation, or State action"); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296,
299 (1966) (analyzing lines between private and state action); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149, 164-66 (1978) (rejecting claim that state had delegated traditional power to
warehouseman through role of sheriff in property seizure). The "state action" prerequisite
loomed large during the congressional debates that produced the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and explains why Congress ultimately felt it necessary to rely on the Commerce Clause and
the Spending Power. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 292-
93 n.1 (Goldberg,J., concurring) (discussing legislative history of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
The requirement to prove action "under color of state law" stretches back to early, narrow
constructions of what is now 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Recent decisions narrowing Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), have established a more stringent requirement of state involve-
ment. See, e.g., Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002) (holding only "un-
ambiguously conferred right" supports cause of action brought under § 1983); Andersun
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645-46 (1987) (expanding "qualified immunity" to protect
police officers who "could have believed" warrantless search was lawful).
76. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action,"
Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 69, 107 (1967).
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and judges were spending a great deal of time, effort, and resources to
answer a question entirely preliminary to getting to the merits of any par-
ticular dispute.7 7 Black acknowledged that there might well be privacy
claims, for instance, that could and sometimes should trump equal pro-
tection arguments. 78 His forceful argument was, however, that it would be
best to get to the merits and to wrestle directly with such a conflict, ra-
ther than to wastefully shadowbox through seemingly endless inquiries as
to what facts, circumstances, and entanglements by state actors would
suffice to constitute the required state action. 79
Black was well into his eighties when he published A New Birth of
Freedom, in which he explained and expounded upon Abraham Lincoln's
concept of national citizenship rights and his own constitutional theory,
combining the Declaration of Independence and the Ninth Amendment
with the rights and protections afforded by the post-Civil War
Amendments.8" Black said that the alternative to the fundamental
recognition of kinship was-as he put it with characteristic flair-to be
haunted by the "grisly undead corse of 'states rights,"' of the sort associ-
ated with South Carolina'sJohn C. Calhoun.8 '
Ironically, albeit perhaps not entirely intentionally, the majority and
concurring opinions in McDonald v. City of ChicagoP2 follow Charles Black
77. See id. at 70 ("The amenability of racial injustice to national legal correction is in-
versely proportional to the durability and scope of the state action 'doctrine,' and of the
ways of thinking to which it is linked.").
78. See id. at 100 (" [E]xpansion of the 'state action' concept to include every form of
state fostering, enforcement, and even toleration does not have to mean that the four-
teenth amendment is to regulate the genuinely private concerns of man.").
79. See id. at 100-01 ("[T]he thing needed ... is not a doctrine of 'state action'
unresponsive entirely in terms and only crudely and fitfully responsive in application to
the required distinction, but rather a substantive rule of reason operating in the
interpretation of the equal protection clause .... ").
80. Charles L. Black, Jr., A New Birth of Freedom: Human Rights, Named and Un-
named, at ix (1997) [hereinafter Black, A New Birth of Freedom].
81. Id. at 80; Charles L. Black, Jr., Paths to Desegregation, in The Occasions of
Justice, Essays Mostly on Law 144, 160 (1963).
82. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). The relevant parts of Justice Alito's opinion were joined
by a majority of the Court. Id. at 3026.
As a textual and historical matter, however, even Justice Thomas's broad privileges
and immunities theory ought not to apply the Takings Clause to the states. Cf. id. at 3059
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he right to keep and bear arms is a privilege of American
citizenship that applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or
Immunities Clause."). That Clause from the Fifth Amendment was intentionally omitted
from the language of the Fourteenth Amendment while other Fifth Amendment language
was repeated verbatim, the author has argued, primarily to avoid attempts by former
slaveholders to seek compensation for having had their slave property taken from them.
See Aviam Soifer, Text-Mess: There Is No Textual Basis for Application of the Takings
Clause to the States, 28 U. Haw. L. Rev. 373, 379-80 (2006) (noting "the leading members
of Congress and their allies very recently had 'taken' huge amounts of 'property' from
southern slaveholders" and "UIust compensation, to put it mildly,... can[not] ... be said
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in recognizing the incorporation of fundamental protections through
the post-Civil War Amendments in ways that radically altered federalism.
Justice Alito's opinion emphasized that the protections embodied in
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment built directly on the earlier stat-
utes and extended well beyond antidiscrimination. He claimed, for
example, that "[t] he unavoidable conclusion is that the Civil Rights Act,
like the Freedmen's Bureau Act, aimed to protect 'the constitutional
right to bear arms' and not simply to prohibit discrimination. ' Alito's
expansive concept of foundational rights guaranteed by the federal gov-
ernment to both blacks and their white supporters through statutes and
the Fourteenth Amendment gave short shrift to federalism concerns. To
assure that the right to bear arms is not "a second-class right" and that
the Fourteenth Amendment affords protection beyond its antidiscrimina-
tion meanings, Alito emphasized the statutory and constitutional promise
of "full and equal" federal protection for foundational, substantive
rights. 4 Justice Scalia, despite what he declared to have been initial reluc-
tance, again concurred in what he called a "'long established and nar-
rowly limited"' selective incorporation approach to judicial intervention
premised on substantive due process.8 5
It was Justice Thomas's attempt to resuscitate the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that most emphati-
cally argued for basic rethinking of the post-Civil War period-a time
when constitutional amendments were enacted to "repair the Nation
from the damage slavery had caused."86 Indeed, Thomas proclaimed, "§ 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment... significantly altered our system of gov-
ernment."87
to have had much to do with the new inclusion of 'privileges or immunities' or 'equal
protection' in the Federal Constitution through the Fourteenth Amendment").
83. 130 S. Ct. at 3040-41.
84. See id. at 3036-44. It is striking that Alito relied on such Radical Republican lead-
ers as Senator Charles Sumner and Representative Thaddeus Stevens-and even the out-
spoken abolitionist Lysander Spooner-as well as Charles Black, Jr. and Eric Foner to
build his case for federal protection of fundamental rights. See, e.g., id. at 3030, 3038,
3041.
85. Id. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275
(1994) (Scalia,J., concurring)).
86. Id. at 3060 (Thomas, J, concurring). To be sure, the Court has recognized this
fundamental change before without it seeming to matter much. See, e.g., Patsy v. Bd. of
Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 503 (1982) (referring to "the basic alteration of our federal system
accomplished during the Reconstruction Era"); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664
(1974) ("[T]he Civil War Amendments to the Constitution ... serve as a sword, rather
than merely as a shield, for those whom they were designed to protect.").
87. 130 S. Ct. at 3060 (Thomas, J., concurring). Thomas went on to explain that the
logical reading of Section I's provision that "No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" is as an affirma-
tive guarantee of rights. Id. at 3077. The same could and should be said of the provision
that follows, which declares that "nor shall any state... deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
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These McDonald opinions almost surely say more about the Court's
enthusiasm for guns-framed in terms of "[s]elf-defense [a]s a basic
right"s--than about any fundamental rethinking of the recent recrudes-
cence ofjudicial limits on Congress's power that is purportedly anchored
in federalism. The source for the new right applied to the states may be a
new category of undifferentiated fundamental rights that stretch well be-
yond antidiscrimination principles or, perhaps, some grudgingly ac-
cepted new substantive due process rights, or even the revitalized atten-
tion to the privileges or immunities of national citizens urged by Justice
Thomas. Nonetheless, unless McDonald turns out to be a ticket good for
this right and this right only, its reasoning ought to complicate renewed
efforts to retrench post-Civil War constitutional guarantees premised on
abstract states' rights theories.
That said, however, the capacity of lawyers and judges to ignore his-
tory and interpose the barriers they desire remains quite alarming.
Several recent cases involving alleged human trafficking and other forms
of appalling exploitation construed the Thirteenth Amendment and the
contemporary version of the Peonage Abolition Act of 1867 in alarming
ways. After all, even the Civil Rights Cases majority had acknowledged that
[t]his [Thirteenth] [A]mendment, as well as the Fourteenth, is
undoubtedly self-executing without any ancillary legislation, so
far as its terms are applicable to any existing state of circum-
stances. By its own unaided force and effect it abolished slavery,
and established universal freedom. Still, legislation may be nec-
essary and proper to meet all the various cases and circum-
stances to be affected by it, and to prescribe proper modes of re-
dress for its violation in letter or spirit. And such legislation may
be primary and direct in its character; for the amendment is not
a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slav-
ery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servi-
tude shall not exist in any part of the United States. 9
Yet federal judges in recent years have gone so far as to assert that
the Thirteenth Amendment cannot be self-executing and that federal
civil actions based on the current version of the Peonage Abolition Act
88. 130 S. Ct. at 3035 (majority opinion).
89. 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).Justice Bradley continued,
It is true, that slavery cannot exist without law, any more than property in lands
and goods can exist without law: and, therefore, the Thirteenth Amendment
may be regarded as nullifying all State laws which establish or uphold slavery. But
it has a reflex character also, establishing and decreeing universal civil and politi-
cal freedom throughout the United States; and it is assumed, that the power
vested in Congress to enforce the article by appropriate legislation, clothes
Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all
badges and incidents of slavery in the United States ....
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require state action.9" Without explanation, a statute passed before the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified thus has taken on a state action re-
quirement that is dubious within the terms of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but nonexistent within the Thirteenth Amendment.
The need to act forcefully in the face of extraordinary failures to
protect citizens was a major theme informing both Amendments, as this
Essay argued above. Congress was quite confident of its broad enforce-
ment power when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Peonage
Abolition Act of 1867. Yet it now seems impossible to reconcile the con-
temporaneous Thirty-Ninth Congress's views of its own enforcement
power with recent interpretations by the Court. To describe Board of
Trustees v. GarretP1 and United States v. Morrison,9 2 for example, as "crab-
bed interpretations" of Congress's power to enforce constitutional rights
seems almost insulting to crabs. Neither abstract theories of "our federal-
ism" nor uncritical faith in the virtues of individualism ought to blind us
to promises made by the Thirty-Ninth Congress. Unlike AndrewJohnson,
members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress came to understand the need to
protect all citizens and to guarantee full as well as equal benefits of all
laws and proceedings, even for those who seemingly consented to con-
tracting away their basic rights.
II. PROTECTION AND PATERNALISM: THE CONCEPT OF "VOLUNTARY
PEONAGE"
Voluntary peonage might seem a contradiction in terms-it would
initially appear that peonage, by definition, cannot be voluntary. Indeed,
the idea of entering peonage voluntarily does pose a philosophical chal-
lenge. Yet even brief consideration of the concept will suggest that volun-
tary peonage has a distinguished lineage. In addition, a sampling ofjudi-
cial decisions about involuntary servitude-including several relatively
recent examples by distinguished judges-illustrates how important the
90. John Roe I v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 997-98 (S.D. Ind. 2007)
(discussing precedent and finding "The Civil Rights Cases did not hold or suggest that there
is a private right of damages directly under the Thirteenth Amendment, nor is such a pri-
vate right of damages intended for the Thirteenth Amendment to be effective");Jane Doe
I v. Reddy, No. C 02-05570 WHA, 2003 WL 23893010, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2003) (re-
jecting argument that Peonage Abolition Act "was intended to implement the Thirteenth
Amendment, whose language it mirrors and which has no state-action requirement"); cf.
Craine v. Alexander, 756 F.2d 1070, 1074 (5th Cir. 1985) (concluding "plaintiffs proceed-
ing under [the Peonage Abolition Act] must show some state responsibility for the abuse
complained of'). See generally Jennifer S. Nam, The Case of the Missing Case: Examining
the Civil Right of Action for Human Trafficking Victims, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1655 (2007)
(describing underutilization of civil right of action for trafficking victims).
91. 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (finding Eleventh Amendment bars suits to "recover
money damages by reason of [a] State's failure to comply with the . . . Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990").
92. 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000) (finding "Congress lacked constitutional authority to
enact.., a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated violence").
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relevant provision in the Peonage Abolition Act of 1867 might have been
had it survived stingy judicial interpretations and what almost seems to be
purposeful amnesia.
A. Bible Stories
The Hebrew Bible's story of Jacob-another kind of founding fa-
ther-offers a striking example of voluntary servitude.9" Jacob's decisions
have been discussed over many centuries, but he is generally celebrated
for his persistence within an extended condition of voluntary peonage.
In order to marry Laban's daughter, Rachel, a woman he loved at first
sight, Jacob proposed that he work for Laban for seven years. When
Jacob finished his term of years, however, Laban tricked him into marry-
ing Laban's older daughter, Leah, instead.94 Undeterred, Jacob signed
on for another seven years and, finally, the hero of the story did get the
girl.
Of course, the Hebrew Bible accepts and is actually quite specific
about slavery. A Hebrew slave, for instance, was to be freed after seven
years. "But," according to Exodus 21:5-6, "if the slave declares, 'I love my
master, and my wife and children: I do not wish to go free,'" then the
slave was to be free to make such a choice-though the master was com-
manded to pierce the ear of the slave with an awl and the slave was then
to remain a slave for the rest of his life. 95
In the nineteenth century, the Bible's embrace of slavery became a
commonplace defense of slavery and was a key element in the schisms
that split many Christian denominations in the United States. 9 6 For
centuries, a central justification for slavery had been that captors were
entitled to kill their captives; therefore, it was argued widely, the decision
to merely enslave captives was actually an act of mercy.97 This classic
example of the "greater power includes the lesser power" type of argu-
ment focuses on the consent of the master, but the truly tragic choices
that slaves faced in the United States also purportedly contained ele-
ments of consent as well as emotional and intellectual resistance. As the
old freedom song put it, for example, "Oh freedom, oh freedom, oh
93. Genesis 29:1-30 (Etz Hayim).
94. As Genesis succinctly puts it, "Leah had weak eyes; Rachel was shapely and beauti-
ful." Id. at 29:17.
95. Exodus 21:5-6 (Etz Hayim).
96. See Sydney E. Ahistrom, A Religious History of the American People 648-69
(2004).
97. See, e.g., The Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Maryland
931 (Annapolis, Richard P. Bayly 1864) (statement of Rep. George Sands) ("[I]f [the cap-
tor] spared the lives of those he took captive, it was his own gift and he had the right to
the benefit of it.").
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freedom over me/And before I'd be a slave I'll be buried in my
grave/And go home to my Lord and be free."98
As the Civil War approached, advocates speaking on behalf of what
antislavery activists began to call the Slave Power grew increasingly defen-
sive, and their attacks on what they labeled Wage Slavery in the North
became more vehement. Indeed, their defense of the humanity of slav-
ery, in contrast to the harshness of the wage system, extended so far as to
include creating a statute that established a process through which a free
black could find a master and then choose to become a slave. 99
Unsurprisingly, no evidence suggests this statute was ever utilized.
Furthermore, in the spring of 1862, before there was any word of
Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, Union Major General David
Hunter jumped the gun when he declared that all former slaves who
came within the territory his troops controlled in the Department of the
South were instantly free and that volunteer black soldiers were welcome.
Hunter defended his action by explaining that he had armed former
slaves so that, under his "fugitive master law," they could "pursue, capture
and bring back those persons of whose protection they ha[d] . . .been
suddenly bereft."' 0 Though Hunter's sardonic humor caused contro-
versy and his bold declaration was reversed by President Abraham
Lincoln, Eric Foner's prize-winning recent study of Lincoln compellingly
demonstrates how quickly and how much Lincoln himself, and the views
of many in the North, changed in the course of the war concerning how
to deal with former slaves.
10
'
B. The Freedom to Choose Slavey
Even under the law of slavery, blacks who became free when their
masters took them into states that had abolished slavery often confronted
gut-wrenching decisions. To remain free in the North often would mean
abandoning partners-because slave marriages were not allowed-as well
as children who remained enslaved. In Betty's Case, for example,
Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw declared, after a ten-minute
interview with a young woman who had been a slave in Tennessee, that it
would be "a denial of her freedom" to reject her decision to return to
98. Lucy Kinchen Chorale, Oh Freedom, on Oh Freedom! (Lucy Kinchen Chorale
2003). See generally Toni Morrison, Beloved (1987).
99. See, e.g., Va. Code tit. 30, ch. 103, § 3 (1869) ("It shall be lawful for any free per-
son of color, resident within this commonwealth, of the age of eighteen years if a female,
and of the age of twenty-one years if a male, to choose his or her master, upon the terms
and conditions herein after mentioned."); see generally Stanley W. Campbell, The Slave
Catchers: Enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law, 1850-1860 (1968) (describing sustained
conflict over federalism in context of fugitive slaves and free states).
100. John G. Sproat, Blueprint for Radical Reconstruction, 23J.S. Hist. 25, 30 (1957)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
101. Eric Foner, The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery 207-08
(2010) [hereinafter Foner, The Fiery Trial].
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slavery.'0 2 As Edlie Wong recently put it, freedom actually could be "yet
another form of trauma" under such circumstances. 10 3 Indeed, antislav-
ery activists "found themselves at an impasse: the hermeneutic limit of an
emergent liberal discourse of contract premised on universalized notions
of will and free choice in a partially free world."'0 4
Members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress might well have recalled and
worried about some of the still-recent cases of slaves who "voluntarily"
chose slavery over freedom. In addition, the old apprenticeship system
had not fully disappeared by the 1860s. As Robert Steinfeld explained,
"From its inception, indentured servitude had primarily been considered
a form of contractual freedom."0 5 Concepts about contractual freedom
changed significantly throughout the nineteenth century as workers be-
gan to believe that "[p]art of their natural liberty consisted in their
power to alienate the property in their own capacities to other per-
sons."0 6 Even within the rise of formal contract law after the Civil War,
however, any laborer who contracted to work for another could be seen
as surrendering his or her freedom while, at the same time, coerced la-
bor was largely accepted for paupers and the like. 10 7 Even the core of the
contract law paradigm could, at times, be considered to be a form of pe-
onage. In the name of the liberty of the individual, courts would not or-
der specific performance, yet the potential damages that could be as-
sessed against a laborer might effectively do much the same thing. The
extent to which specific performance can indeed be required remains an
intriguing-but also vexed-corner of contemporary contract law. 08
102. 20 Monthly L. Rep. 455 (Mass. Nov. 9, 1857). For discussion of this case and its
context, see Aviam Soifer, Constrained Choices: New England Slavery Decisions in the
Antebellum Era, in Freedom's Conditions in the U.S.-Canadian Borderlands in the Age of
Emancipation 173, 188-90 (Tony Freyer & Lyndsay Campbell, eds., 2011); Soifer,
Promises Unkept, supra note 8, at 1921-30.
103. Edlie L. Wong, Neither Fugitive nor Free: Atlantic Slavery, Freedom Suits, and
the Legal Culture of Travel 104 (2009).
104. Id. at 100.
105. Steinfeld, Invention of Free Labor, supra note 38, at 7.
106. Id. at 156; see also RobertJ. Steinfeld, Coercion, Contract, and Free Labor in
the Nineteenth Century 236 (2001) ("[T]he clear consensus, in the middle of the nine-
teenth century was that freedom should not include the freedom to alienate one's free-
dom.").
107. See generally Bruce A. Kimball, The Inception of Modern Professional
Education: C.C. Langdell, 1826-1906 (2009) (discussing Christopher Columbus Langdell
and rise of case method within legal education, with emphasis on contract law); Amy Dru
Stanley, From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage and the Market in the Age of
Slave Emancipation (1998) (describing relationship between contract law and prohibition
of slavery).
108. See generally Nathan B. Oman, Specific Performance and the Thirteenth
Amendment, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 2020 (2009) (arguing that "involuntary servitude" does not
justify per se prohibition on specific performance in personal service contracts); Udi Sagi,
Specific Performance of Enlistment Contracts, 205 Mil. L. Rev. 150 (2010). Sagi points out
that certain international law instruments declare that "'[nlo one shall be required to
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C. Probing Paternalism
A working definition of "paternalism" that could be of use might be
as follows: someone else deciding for you, allegedly for your own good.
And "paternalism" has considerable potency as a pejorative label. Yet we
ought to recognize that our parents and teachers exercise paternalism
toward and for us repeatedly, to both good and ill effect. Even if the let-
ters of "paternalism" were rearranged to become "parentalism," however,
the question of how to ascertain genuine consent looms large and lasts
for a long time in most families as well as in the law. This typically is the
case on both sides of the parent-child equation. Judges often anoint
themselves as protectors of individuals against paternalism, but they lack
adequate criteria to determine if and when paternalism ought to be in-
validated. In reality, it is exceedingly difficult for any outside
decisionmakers to discern when a decision made on behalf of someone
else seems to go too far. And judges often miss the fact that they often
are assuming a paternalistic role themselves in determining what consti-
tutes impermissible paternalism. 10 9
It is striking-even shocking-to read some of the judicial
interpretations of criminal laws that forbade peonage over the past sev-
eral decades. Perhaps most notorious was Justice O'Connor's opinion for
the Court in United States v. Kozminski. °10 The decision invalidated the
convictions of members of the Kozminski family who had held two men-
perform forced or compulsory labour."' Sagi, supra, at 185 (alteration in original) (quot-
ing International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 8, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR]). As Sagi puts it, this language "strongly suggests a broad inter-
pretation of the terms 'slavery' and 'servitude."' Id.
Efforts by the United States to add the word "involuntary" before the prohibition on
"servitude" in the ICCPR failed. Id. On the other hand, as Sagi points out, the
International Labour Organization's Convention Concerning Forced Labour similarly
prohibits "'all work of service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any
penalty,"' yet, unlike the ICCPR, it does not prohibit forced labor that was entered into
voluntarily. Id. at 185 n.217 (quoting International Labour Organization, Convention (No.
29) Concerning Forced Labour art. 2,June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55).
109. In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish-a decision that upheld minimum wages for
women and that marked a crucial turning point, as the Court moved away from its aggres-
sive activism on behalf of "liberty of contract," which had dominated its decisions for sev-
eral decades-ChiefJustice Hughes wrote for the Court that
exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position with respect to
bargaining power and are thus relatively defenceless against the denial of a living
wage is not only detrimental to their health and well being but casts a direct bur-
den for their support upon the community. What these workers lose in wages the
taxpayers are called upon to pay.
300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937); see also Pope, supra note 4, at 1494 ("While refusing to hear
coercion claims from industrial workers, the Lochner-era Court took a more sensitive ap-
proach toward 'groups it understood as weak,' a category including women and black pe-
ons, but not industrial workers." (quoting Aziz Z. Huq, Peonage and Contractual Liberty,
101 Colum. L. Rev. 351, 386 (2001))).
110. 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
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tally retarded farm workers on a dairy farm "in poor health, in squalid
conditions, and in relative isolation from the rest of society" for well over
a decade."' Stressing the concept of lenity in construing criminal stat-
utes, the Court held that even extreme psychological coercion would not
suffice to render involuntary servitude criminal.1 2 Remarkably, the deci-
sion was unanimous, though Justices Brennan and Stevens wrote concur-
ring opinions, in which Justices Marshall and Blackmun, respectively,
joined."' There was no suggestion, however, that someone should have
and could have intervened-paternalistically, perhaps-to seek lost
wages and other remedies on behalf of farm workers Fulmer and
Molitoris. Such a lawsuit might even have been based on the statutory
successor to the Peonage Abolition Act of 1867.114
Elsewhere the author has explored the paradoxical nature of pater-
nalism in the context of Thirteenth Amendment decisions by the
Supreme Court from 1888 to 1921.115 The Court's actions then ranged
from continuing to compel service by those too young or too old to enlist
in the army,1 16 to eviscerating the claims made by black freedmen against
Indian tribes that had enslaved them," 7 and to rejecting claims of sea-
men to be free from the longstanding paternalism that imprisoned them
111. Id. at 934-35. The workers, Robert Fulmer and Louis Molitoris, were directed
not to leave the farm and they worked "seven days a week, often 17 hours a day, at first for
$15 per week and eventually for no pay. The Kozminskis subjected the two men to physical
and verbal abuse for failing to do their work and instructed herdsmen employed at the
farm to do the same." Id.
112. The Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 1584 and 18 U.S.C. § 241 both required proof
of "compulsion of services by the use or threatened use of physical or legal coercion." Id.
at 948, 952. Congress responded in 2000 by enacting the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended
in scattered titles of the U.S.C.). See Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Promise of Congressional
Enforcement, in The Promises of Liberty, supra note 2, at 182, 190-91 (discussing congres-
sional response to Kozminski).
113. 487 U.S. at 953 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 965 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Perhaps even more striking was Judge Henry Friendly's pinched interpretation of § 1584
in United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2nd Cir. 1964), largely relied on by the
Kozminski Court. Friendly warned of a slippery slope-"the awful machinery of the crimi-
nal law to be brought into play whenever an employee asserts that his will to quit has been
subdued by a threat which seriously affects his future welfare but as to which he still has a
choice, however painful"-and reversed the conviction of an immigrant rabbi who kept a
Mexican worker working on his chicken farm with threats to have the worker deported
after he had signed a two-year contract that required that he never drink or leave the farm.
Id. at 487. Friendly interpreted the criminal statute to require a showing that there was "no
way to avoid" the owner's compulsion. Id. at 486.
114. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 187, sec. 1, 14 Stat. 546 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1994). The current version of the statute differs in only minor ways from the origi-
nal, omitting, for instance, the phrase "territory of New Mexico," and instead simply refer-
ring to "territory or state."
115. See generally Soifer, Paradox of Paternalism, supra note 45.
116. In re Morrissey, 137 U.S. 157 (1890); In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890).
117. United States v. Choctaw Nation, 193 U.S. 115 (1904).
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and forced them back to work'18-allegedly for their own good." 9 Rela-
tively obscure decisions often turned on whether someone was said by a
judge to have consented to harsh, long-term working conditions. In an
era when men seemed to "'relish a ruthless theory,"' 120 it turned out-as
it probably still would turn out today-that there were both good and
bad kinds of paternalism. Close study of the Court's well-known peonage
decision in Bailey v. Alabama,121 for example, makes this clear.
Ultimately, as Justice Brennan stated in his concurrence in
Kozminski,
It is of course not easy to articulate when a person's actions are
"involuntary." In some minimalist sense the laborer always has a
choice no matter what the threat: the laborer can choose to
work, or take a beating; work, or go to jail. We can all agree that
these choices are so illegitimate that any decision to work is
"involuntary. "122
Brennan went on to emphasize the need for the prosecutor to prove
the existence of compulsion akin to servitude to meet the criminal stat-
ute's requirement.1 23 Nonetheless, he also noted, "Congress intended to
protect persons subjected to involuntary servitude by forms of coercion
more subtle than force." 124
Both Brennan and Stevens mentioned but also sought to avoid the
task of resolving "the philosophical meaning of free will" in their concur-
ring opinions. 125 That such a question looms large and implicates judg-
ments that are "highly individualized" and perhaps "hopelessly subjec-
tive"1 26 makes the very concept of "voluntary peonage" seem even more
problematic.
Nonetheless, as the Court summarized in Pollock v. Williams, "The
undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amendment ... was not merely to end
slavery but to maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor
118. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
119. See Soifer, Paradox of Paternalism, supra note 45, at 260-68.
120. R. Jackson Wilson, In Quest of Community: Social Philosophy in the United
States, 1860-1920, at 56 (1968) (quoting philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce).
121. 219 U.S. 219 (1911). Justice Hughes's majority opinion invalidated Alabama's
presumption of criminal fraud in the breach of a labor contract, relying on the Thirteenth
Amendment's protection against "control by which the personal service of one man is
disposed or coerced for another's benefit." Id. at 241. Bailey has been discussed by many
scholars; for the author's view, see Soifer, Paradox of Paternalism, supra note 45, at 271-
73.
122. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 959 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring).
123. See id. at 961-62 (discussing interpretation of "involuntary servitude").
124. Id. at 957.
125. Id. at 959; id. at 967-70 (Stevens, J. concurring) (advocating case-by-case, rather
than hypothetical, approach including varied interpretations of what constitutes compul-
sion).
126. Id. at 960 (Brennan,J., concurring).
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throughout the United States."1 27 The theme of free labor permeated the
early ideology of the Republican Party, and it pervaded debates concern-
ing freedom throughout the Thirty-Ninth Congress as well as the evolv-
ing thoughts of Abraham Lincoln.' 2' That Congress banned voluntary
peonage throughout the land has long been overlooked. That ban
through the Peonage Abolition Act of 1867 is particularly significant in
terms of congressional power to enforce the Civil War Amendments in
the quest for the promise of freedom. That freedom, paradoxically, may
require the intervention of others to protect individuals from making
free choices that are not and cannot be truly free.
In recent years, judges have struggled to uphold criminal convictions
even with horrific fact patterns under the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act, whose "legislative history suggests that Congress
passed this act to correct what they viewed as the Supreme Court's mis-
taken holding in United Sates v. Kozminski."'1 29 It has apparently remained
exceptionally difficult for prosecutors to obtain convictions under the
complicated requirements of this and related criminal statutes.
30
Ironically, the bold 1867 guarantee of a basic civil right to be free from
coercion, even if a contract was entered voluntarily, remains on the stat-
ute books but is virtually forgotten. It could and should afford civil reme-
dies for vulnerable people today who are still victimized by successful at-
tempts "to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the vol-
untary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquida-
tion of any debt or obligation, or otherwise."1 31 Rather than becoming
127. 322 U.S. 4, 17-18 (1944).
128. See Foner, The Fiery Trial, supra note 101, at 284-89 (describing Republican
debates about how free labor would replace slave labor). See generally Eric Foner, Free
Soil, supra note 38 (arguing Civil War-era Republicans championed "free labor ideology").
129. United States v. Dann, 652 F.3d 1160, 1169 (9th Cir. 2011). Sitting by designa-
tion, District CourtJudge Nancy Gertner noted in Dann Congress's concern that modern-
day traffickers are "increasingly subtle" and that they often use "nonviolent coercion." Id.;
see also United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 241-45 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding evidence
was sufficient to "to establish [defendant's] intent to participate in the crimes of forced
labor and peonage" of immigrant live-in housekeepers); United States v. Calimlim, 538
F.3d 706, 714-18 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding evidence of abusive treatment of immigrant
live-in housekeeper over many years sufficient to sustain conviction and sentence enhance-
ment for forced labor and harboring of alien for financial gain).
130. See, e.g., Ken Kobayashi, Judge Dismisses Case Against Aloun Farms Owners,
Honolulu Star-Advertiser (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.staradvertiser.com/news/breaking/
126785073.html?id=126785073 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Aug.
4, 2011, 10:34 PM) ("A federal judge granted a request by prosecutors this morning to
dismiss the forced labor charges and related counts against... Aloun Farms."); Feds Drop
Human-Trafficking Prosecution of Global Horizons, Honolulu Star-Advertiser (July 20,
2012, 3:36 PM), http://www.staradvertiser.com/news/breaking/163254156.htnl?
id=163254156 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting "federal prosecutors said
they are unable to prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt").
131. 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2006).
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entangled in whether criminal statutes imply a private right of action,1 32
for example, § 1994 offers virtually a clean slate as well as its compelling
history. Even the restrictive decisions by the Supreme Court that helped
to end Reconstruction and to bring about the rise of Jim Crow recog-
nized the broad promise of the Thirteenth Amendment.
3
CONCLUSION
Recently there has been fine scholarly work that focuses on the de-
bates over the Thirteenth Amendment and that takes various positions
on its intended scope. 34 It is this Essay's claim that in passing the
Peonage Abolition Act of 1867 on the same day as the Military
Reconstruction Act, the Thirty-Ninth Congress demonstrated its belief
that it had broad constitutional authority to guarantee basic civil rights,
132. Compare, e.g., Manliguez v. Joseph, 226 F. Supp. 2d 377, 384 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(holding private right of action implied by prohibition of involuntary servitude in criminal
law, 18 U.S.C. § 1584), with, e.g., Brooks v. George Cnty., Miss., 84 F.3d 157, 169 (5th Cir.
1996) (upholding dismissal of Thirteenth Amendment and other civil rights claims by
pretrial detainee who worked as trusty while being held illegally, except for property claim
seeking wages for work performed on public property); Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549,
1552 (5th Cir. 1990) (requiring proof of compulsion for civil remedy, noting that " [w] hen
the employee has a choice, even though it is a painful one, there is no involuntary servi-
tude"); and Dolla v. Unicast Co., 930 F. Supp. 202, 205 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (declaring critical
elements of peonage are indebtedness and compulsion). Recently, in Velez v. Sanchez, the
Second Circuit strove mightily to allow the victim of blatantly abusive employers to main-
tain a possible Fair Labor Standards Act claim against them, though Judge Droney's opin-
ion rejected the Alien Tort Act and other possible bases for civil remedies. No. 11-90-cv,
2012 WL 3089376, at *14 (2d Cir. July 31, 2012).
133. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) ("By its own unaided force and ef-
fect [the Thirteenth Amendment] abolished slavery, and established universal freedom.
Still, legislation may be necessary and proper to meet all the various cases and circum-
stances to be affected by it, and prescribe proper modes of redress for its violation in letter
or spirit. And such legislation may be primary and direct in its character, for the amend-
ment is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an abso-
lute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the
United States."); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873)
("Undoubtedly while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which proposed
the thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican
peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop slavery of the Mexican or
Chinese race within our territory, this amendment may safely be trusted to make it void.").
See generally C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career ofJim Crow (1955) (documenting
relatively late rise ofJim Crow, primarily in 1880s and 1890s).
134. See, e.g., Jennifer Mason McAward, Congressional Authority to Interpret the
Thirteenth Amendment: A Response to Professor Tsesis, 71 Md. L. Rev. 60 (2011) (argu-
ing for more limited scope of congressional power under Enforcement Clause); George
Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 94 Va. L. Rev.
1367 (2008) (arguing that Thirteenth Amendment provided foundation for extending
scope of congressional power to private action); Alexander Tsesis, Congressional Authority
to Interpret the Thirteenth Amendment, 71 Md. L. Rev. 40 (2011) (arguing for broad
scope of congressional power under Enforcement Clause, in contrast to Fourteenth
Amendment).
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including the rights of free labor, throughout the United States. The po-
litical and institutional context helps to explain why Congress believed
that it could ban voluntary, as well as involuntary, peonage of all sorts.
The old federalism had died a bloody death through the years of the
Civil War. The men of the Thirty-Ninth Congress wished to assure that
when the states that had seceded were reconstructed and readmitted,
they would protect the rights of freedpersons and their supporters not
only from violence authorized by state and local governments but also
from the private depredations that still dominated Southern life in 1867.
If and only if that occurred would the federal government recede from
its obligation to protect all its citizens.
John Locke maintained that people were willing to relinquish the
state of nature to gain protection. Indeed, this might be considered the
crux of the Lockean social contract. Yet protection often seems to import
paternalism; in addition, people tend to deny that they need protection
even when they do. The American belief in self-reliance is deep and
wide. During the Civil War, for example, as people in the North debated
what to do with the former slaves, Frederick Douglass insisted "[D]o
nothing with them. . . .Your doing with them is their greatest misfor-
tune."1 35 Of course neither Douglass nor Lincoln was fully consistent in
his views about the duty of government to protect those in need.'36 In
addition, a central theme that weaves throughout recent studies of
Reconstruction is that the context for decisions seemed to change rapidly
and repeatedly.
By early 1867, Congress believed that the nation faced a crisis.
Congressmen anchored their responses to how to reconstruct the South
in their growing belief that sweeping federal power was legitimate and
necessary, even unto sending in the troops. Disastrously, they believed,
the pre-Civil War Constitution had protected the Slave Power. Now fed-
eral protection was necessary for those who had been enslaved as well as
for their beleaguered allies. They were sure that Section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment authorized congressional action that explicitly
reached beyond Section l's prohibitions against slavery and involuntary
servitude. Congressional authority stretched throughout the entire terri-
135. 3 The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass 188-89 (Philip S. Foner ed.,
1975).
136. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, for instance, delighted to quote Lincoln's
statement that "[t]he legitimate object of government is to do for a community of people
whatever they need to have done, but cannot do at all, or cannot so well do, for them-
selves, in their separate and individual capacities." 3 Life and Works of Abraham Lincoln
215 (Marion Mills Miller ed., 1907); see Franklin D. Roosevelt, Government and Modern
Capitalism (Sept. 30, 1934), in FDR's Fireside Chats 53, 62 (Russell D. Buhite & David W.
Levy eds., 1992) (quoting Lincoln and noting likeminded belief). Roosevelt continued, "I
am not for a return to that definition of liberty under which for many years a free people
were being gradually regimented into the service of the privileged few." Id.
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tory of the United States to all who might find that they had become pe-
ons, even if they purportedly had entered peonage voluntarily.
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